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ABSTRACT: Plurivaluationism is an approach to solving the Sorites Paradox based on 
the idea that vague discourse has more than one acceptable interpretation. Since 
plurivaluationism is a framework which enables one to utilize different underlying 
logics, three basic versions can be identified – bivalent, many-valued and fuzzy. The 
aim of this paper is to show how three-valued plurivaluationism, as proposed by 
Wang, fares against its competitors. In the first and second part, some of the tra-
ditional approaches to solving the Sorites Paradox are outlined and are confronted 
with two objections based on the problem of higher-order vagueness – the so-called 
location problem and the jolt problem. The third part is dedicated to introducing 
and evaluating different versions of plurivaluationism, with an emphasis on com-
paring Wang’s three-valued plurivaluationism to its competitors. While three-valued 
plurivaluationism is a promising enterprise, I show that some modifications Wang 
made to his system cause the location problem in plurivaluationism to re-emerge, 
and it also fails to provide a satisfactory answer to the jolt problem.
KEY WORDS: Fuzzy logic, many-valued logic, plurivaluationism, sorites paradox, 
three-valued logic, vagueness.
1. Introduction
Higher-order vagueness is a problem which plagues most approaches to solv-
ing the Sorites Paradox. According to Smith (2008), there are two aspects of 
higher-order vagueness – the location problem and the jolt problem. Briefly, the 
location problem consists in our inability to justify the placement of sharp 
boundaries when dealing with vagueness, and the jolt problem consists in there 
being a jump in truth-value between some of the members of the soritical se-
quence. Most of the approaches to solving the Sorites Paradox cannot succeed 
with at least one of these problems. Plurivaluationism is a framework that is 
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based on a multiplicity of acceptable interpretations, therefore it is equipped 
to deal with the location problem, as will be shown later. According to Smith, 
it is only a fuzzy version of plurivaluationism that is capable of successfully 
dealing with the jolt problem. However, Wang (2016) proposes a three-valued 
version of plurivaluationism, which can deal with the jolt problem as well.
My goal in this paper is to show the problems connected with Wang’s 
version of plurivaluationism. Namely, I will show his amendments to three-
valued logic based plurivaluationism directed towards the jolt problem beg 
the question as to why one should prefer his three-valued approach to Smith’s 
fuzzy plurivaluationism. I will argue that if one wants to employ a non-fuzzy 
version of plurivaluationism, one must bite the bullet and approach the jolt 
problem from another viewpoint.
2. Traditional approaches and the location problem
When dealing with vagueness and the Sorites Paradox, proponents of “tra-
ditional approaches”, e.g., epistemicism and supervaluationism, failed to see 
one crucial assumption their approaches are based on – the existence of only 
one intended interpretation of language. This assumption is the main cause 
of the higher order vagueness problems, i.e., the location problem and the 
jolt problem.
First, let us consider the location problem. Vague terms can be con-
trasted with precise terms based on our inability to sharply draw borderlines 
to apply to vague terms. With precise terms, we can always unequivocally de-
termine whether the term in question is applicable or not. If we take the term 
“prime”, we know exactly to which entities it can be applied. We know that 
it is true to say “5 is a prime number”, we know that “6 is a prime number” 
is a false statement, and we also know Julius Caesar is not the right kind of 
entity for the term “prime” to be applied to.1 While there are undoubtedly 
numbers (very large numbers) which we are unable to classify as either primes 
or composite numbers, this is a problem that can be resolved.
With vague terms, however, the situation is radically different. There is 
no clear line delineating the applicability of vague terms. Even though the 
applicability of at least some vague terms may seem to supervene on some 
precisely expressible value or measure, this does not help us in determining 
the applicability of the vague terms in question. We may know a pile of sand 
is composed of exactly 58,438 grains of sand, yet we would still be unable to 
1 For the purposes of this paper, it is inconsequential whether sentences like “Julius Cae-
sar is a prime number” are lacking any truth-value, are false, or have some intermediate truth-
value. What matters is that when precise terms are considered, it is clear to which entities these 
are applicable or not, e.g., it is clear that “prime number” is applicable to numbers.
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tell precisely when it becomes a heap of sand. The question of whether some 
large number is prime or not can be resolved by having more computing 
power at our disposal. The question of whether a man measuring 1.82 metres 
is tall cannot be resolved by any empirical measurement or computation. 
Even if we know that the man actually measures 1.82436738 metres, we are 
still no closer to a definitive answer to the question whether or not he is tall.
Traditional approaches to solving the Sorites Paradox postulate some 
borders of vague terms’ applicability.2 According to the epistemicists, there is 
actually a sharp border between vague terms’ applicability and, in this aspect, 
they are similar to precise terms (cf. Williamson 1994; Sorensen 1988). How-
ever, in principle, we are unable to locate this border, since we are unable to 
distinguish between two entities which are very similar in aspects relevant to 
the applicability of the vague term in question. Our inability to locate precise 
boundaries is due to the so-called margin for error principle (cf. Williamson 
1994: 226–230), which states that if there is no evidence that would enable 
us to distinguish any two situations, we must judge both situations equally.
Although there are many different many-valued logics (cf. Gottwald 
2015), when vagueness and the Sorites Paradox are concerned, there are basi-
cally only two kinds that are used – three-valued logics (cf. Körner 1976; Tye 
1990, 1994) and degree theories such as fuzzy logic.
The advantages of three-valued logics are their simplicity and truth-
functionality. For a proponent of three-valued logic, the range of significance 
for a vague term cannot be divided into only two sets of entities. Instead, the 
proponent of three-valued logic uses three sets – a set of entities to which the 
vague term in question is applicable, a set of entities to which the term is not 
applicable, and a set of so-called borderline or penumbral entities, i.e., entities 
which we cannot surely classify into either of the previous sets. Traditional 
two truth-values are therefore inadequate in such situations and a third one 
needs to be introduced in order to incorporate penumbral propositions.
Degree-theoretic and fuzzy approaches share a few common traits – 
truth comes in degrees, there can be potentially infinite truth-values, and 
even small changes in aspects relevant to vague term applicability can bring 
about a small change in truth-value.3 I will use the term “fuzzy approaches” in 
its broad sense in which it encompasses what is nowadays called mathemati-
cal fuzzy logic (cf. Cintula, Fermüller and Noguera 2016; Hájek 1998) and, 
also, so-called degree-theoretic approaches that often employ the same base 
logic as many of the fuzzy approaches – Łukasiewicz logic (Ł). It is also worth 
2 Apart from the nihilistic approach, according to which there are no boundaries since 
there are no heaps, chairs, or no ordinary things (cf. Unger 1979).
3 Proponents of these approaches therefore do not agree with so called principle of toler-
ance (cf. Wright 1975; Kolář 1994).
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mentioning that many fuzzy theoreticians adopted Smith’s plurivaluationist 
framework for fuzzy logic, thereby avoiding both the location and the jolt 
problem. Naïve fuzzy approaches suffer from the location problem and pre-
date Smith’s (2008).
Fuzzy approaches are based on an assumption that vagueness is a matter 
of degree. If A measures more than B, A should be taller than B. This should 
also be, according to fuzzy theorists, represented by different degrees of truth 
being ascribed to sentences like “A is tall” and “B is tall”.
Vague property  is represented by a fuzzy set, i.e., a function  from a 
universe of discourse  to a structure of truth degrees  – usually the real unit in-
terval , where  stands for absolute truth and  for absolute falsity (cf. Běhounek 
2014). Truth-values are linearly ordered. When truth-values  and  are con-
cerned, the connectives behave classically, yet when intermediate degrees of 
truth are concerned, the connectives are defined using triangular norms or 
t-norms. A t-norm is a binary operation  on a unit interval , i.e., a function, 
and is commutative, associative, monotonous and meets boundary condi-
tions (cf. Hájek 1998: 28; Klement, Mesiar and Pap 2000: 4–10). Logic Ł 
(cf. Hájek 1998: 63–87; Gottwald 2001: 179–266) is the logic often used 
by both fuzzy logicians and degree theorists alike (cf. Zadeh 1975, 2008; 
Machina 1976; Edgington 1997; Priest 2003). It is no surprise that Ł is em-
ployed even by philosophers that do not proclaim themselves to be fuzzy 
logicians (cf. Machina 1976; Edgington 1997). Proponents of modern mathe-
matical fuzzy logic, however, even use other logics, such as (Hájek’s) Basic 
fuzzy logic , Pavelka’s logic and others (cf. Hájek and Novák 2003).
A distinguishing feature of infinite-valued approaches is that they enable 
its users to employ fuzzy modifiers, like very true (cf. Hájek 2001), fairly true, 
or the suffix -ish. These modifiers, which are sometimes also called hedges, 
are unary connectives which can modify the sentences’ truth-value. If  states 
that somebody is tall, then , , etc. In this way, fuzzy logic can reflect different 
modifiers by changing the truth-value of a base sentence , which is an option 
that none of the other approaches discussed here can replicate. Fuzzy modi-
fiers like very true or almost true are sometimes employed as a tool to model 
sorites reasoning (cf. Hájek 2001; Hájek and Novák 2003).
The problem all these approaches share is the fact that there are precise 
boundaries of application in all of them. While it is easier to see these bound-
aries when epistemicism and three-valued approaches are considered, fuzzy 
approaches are also based on precise application of limits. While the epis-
temicist approach only has one precise boundary, three-valued approaches 
contain two precise boundaries. One can describe fuzzy approaches as having 
potentially infinite truth-values – and therefore infinitely many boundaries –, 
yet for our purposes, there are two boundaries of interest. The first delineates 
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the point at which the truth-value increases from 0, and the other one deline-
ates the point at which the truth-value decreases from 1. If we place any sharp 
boundaries to separate propositions according to their truth-values or entities 
according to the applicability of some vague term, we must conclude these 
boundaries are completely arbitrary. The question each of these approaches 
must answer is therefore why these boundaries are where they are. None of 
these approaches, however, provides a satisfactory answer.
Trying to avoid the problem of arbitrary boundaries by blurring them is 
a non-starter since the problem just repeats itself – instead of one penumbra 
there would be two, and more than three truth-values would be needed to 
accommodate them. If we add another truth-value, the problem only gets 
worse, as with more truth-values even more penumbras emerge, so even if we 
started with a classical bivalent logic, we would end up with something like 
fuzzy logic. As Sainsbury (1996: 256) eloquently put it, “you do not improve 
a bad idea by iterating it.”
3. The jolt problem
Another higher-order vagueness-related problem is the jolt problem. Accord-
ing to Smith and other proponents of fuzzy approaches, one of the key fea-
tures of vague terms’ applicability is their matter of degree. Some people are 
taller than others, some colours are redder than others, and so on. As was 
mentioned earlier, the idea behind fuzzy approaches is that small changes 
in applicability should be reflected in degrees of truth. This is captured by 
Smith’s (2008: 146) closeness principle: “If  and  are very close in -relevant re-
spects, then ‘’ and ‘’ are very close in respect of truth”. This relation between 
degrees of truth is not as straightforward as it might seem. If there is an in-
crease in a measure relevant to the applicability of a vague term, there doesn’t 
have to be an equal increase in truth-value. If A measures more than B, then 
the sentence “A is tall” must have a truth-value either equal, or greater than 
the sentence “B is tall”. Even naïve fuzzy approaches are in accordance with 
this principle since their use of degrees of truth ensures that the difference 
in truth-value between similar entities should be minimal. So, even though 
there are many changes in truth-values when moving ahead in the sorites 
sequence, these changes are always minute.
With epistemicism and three-valued approaches, however, the situation 
is radically different. Since there are either two or three truth-values, there 
is always a jolt between these truth-values. There are always entities that are 
indistinguishable with respect to all aspects relevant to a given vague term’s 
applicability, yet the truth-values of corresponding sentences’ which mention 
them would be either polar opposites (in epistemicism), or at least radically 
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different (in three-valued approaches). Consider, e.g., a situation in which we 
compare two people – A measures 1.86235 metres and B measures 1.86234 
metres –, and we have two sentences – “A is tall” and “B is tall”. For the 
sake of the argument, let us assume A is clearly tall, while B is not. In fuzzy 
approaches, the two statements would have a very similar truth-value, say 1 
and 0.9997 respectively. In three valued approaches, the first sentence would 
have truth-value 1, while the second one would have truth-value 0.5.4 An 
epistemicist would say that the first sentence has a truth-value of 1, while the 
second one would have a truth-value of 0. The change in the truth-value is 
therefore pretty steep, both in the case of bivalent and three-valued logics.
4. Plurivaluationism
Epistemicism, three-valued approaches, naïve fuzzy approaches, as well as 
some of the other traditional approaches to solving the Sorites Paradox are 
limited by an assumption there is one intended interpretation of language. 
As shown above, this assumption leads to the location problem, since all the 
aforementioned approaches work with precise boundaries. The idea of there 
being precise boundaries, however, seems counterintuitive to many. And if 
we consent to the epistemicist’s treatment of vagueness, we are left with a 
theory that, on the one hand, claims there are precise boundaries but, on the 
other hand, that there is nothing we can do with this knowledge since we can 
never know where these boundaries are.
Plurivaluationism is based on an ingenious idea – there are many equally 
acceptable interpretations of language. The plurivaluationist holds the view 
that if one is trying to solve the Sorites Paradox only within the bounds set by 
a single intended interpretation of language, she is fighting a losing battle. By 
limiting ourselves to a single interpretation of vague discourse, we are bound 
to become victims of the location objection.
By admitting a multiplicity of acceptable interpretations (none of which 
are in any way privileged), plurivaluationists successfully solve the location 
problem by considering many different interpretations, each of which differs 
in assigning different truth-values to sentences containing vague terms, i.e., 
they differ in how vague terms are interpreted. In other words, interpreta-
tions differ from each other by assigning different objects to the extension 
and anti-extension of vague terms.
As Smith (2008: §2.5) correctly pointed out, some philosophers (cf. Varzi 
2003, 2007) in the past mixed plurivaluationism and supervaluationism together. 
4 In this example, I use numerical representations of truth-values – 1 to designate truth-
value True, 0 to designate truth-value False, and 0.5 to designate the third truth-value, i.e., 
Nonsensical or Indeterminate.
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This is an understandable mistake since at a first glance, these approaches look 
very much alike. Nevertheless, there are important differences between them – 
the most important being that supervaluationism (cf. van Fraassen 1966; Keefe 
2000) works with classical extensions of a non-classical model, while plurivalu-
ationism considers different acceptable interpretations of a language.
One might object that plurivaluationism does not elude the location 
objection, but it simply moves it to the next level. Even though now we do 
not have to deal with the location problem when we consider vague terms, we 
have a problem with acceptable interpretations. If there are acceptable inter-
pretations, there must also be some interpretations which are unacceptable. 
What if we say, e.g., that an interpretation of language according to which 
a limit of baldness is having at most 27 hairs is unacceptable, even though 
interpretations with a smaller number of hairs are acceptable? How did we 
come to that conclusion? What gives us the reason to draw the line between 
acceptable and unacceptable interpretations this way?
A proponent of plurivaluationism might propose to treat the notion of 
acceptable interpretations as vague. This though, would only cause an infi-
nite regress. Another option is to adopt an Unger (1979)-like standpoint. If 
we take a vague term, then it is acceptable to say that acceptable interpreta-
tions range from one in which the term is applicable to all objects, to one in 
which the term is applicable to no objects.
Though the second option might seem unappealing, I find nothing in-
herently wrong with it. It is perfectly reasonable to say there is an interpreta-
tion of language according to which there are no bald men, i.e., even men 
with no hair on their heads are not bald. It is also perfectly reasonable to 
believe that (almost) no one would utilize such an interpretation.
It is also worth mentioning the same objection can be raised against 
supervaluationism. Supervaluationists, however, cannot employ the solution 
proposed above, since it would lead to some unwanted consequences. If they 
were to eliminate arbitrary boundaries in their system by permitting pre-
cisifications in which vague terms are applicable from none to all objects in 
their ranges of significance, this would make supervaluationism practically 
useless. If such precisifications were permitted, the upshot would be that all 
atomic sentences’ truth-values, which would depend on the applicability of 
some vague term, would be gappy.5 So, while plurivaluationists do not have 
to consider interpretations of vague language that they find unappealing, su-
pervaluationists must take them into consideration, making vague atomic 
sentences inherently gappy.
5 Composite sentences could still be either true or false.
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4.1. Classical plurivaluationism
It has already been mentioned plurivaluationism is based on a multiplicity of 
acceptable interpretations, yet there has been no mention of what sort these 
interpretations can or should be. I therefore believe it is suitable to use the 
term “plurivaluationism” to denote a framework which employs many inter-
pretations of vague language, independent of the underlying logic. As such, 
this term should be specified when a particular kind of logic is employed. 
Some may advocate classical interpretation, i.e., interpretation based on clas-
sical logic. I call this approach classical plurivaluationism.
As mentioned earlier, by employing a multiplicity of interpretations, 
plurivaluationists successfully dodge the location objection. Smith (2008: 
§4.4), however, charges classical plurivaluationism with its inability to deal 
with the jolt problem. Even though there are many acceptable interpreta-
tions, there is a sharp cut-off point in each of them. And since there are sharp 
cut-off points in every interpretation, the closeness principle is violated and 
the jolt problem is therefore not resolved. And since every classical interpreta-
tion makes a vague term precise, plurivaluationism’s classical version should 
be, according to Smith, rejected.
4.2. Fuzzy plurivaluationism
Another kind of plurivaluationism employs some kind of fuzzy logic as its 
underlying logic. It was pioneered by Smith in his seminal book (2008) and 
developed more recently by, e.g., Běhounek (2014). Unlike its classical ver-
sion, fuzzy plurivaluationism combines fuzzy models and semantic indeter-
minacy concerning the existence of different interpretations of language.
Our vague language has many acceptable fuzzy interpretations simultaneously, 
and as far as semantics is concerned, that is the end of the story. So we have inde-
terminacy, or plurality, of meaning. Unlike in the supervaluationist picture, the 
language is not in a unique (higher-order) semantic state. (Smith 2008: 287)
As Běhounek (2014) points out, fuzzy logics that take only one fuzzy model 
into consideration and operate with membership function and membership 
degree are very well suited for practical applications (engineering, fuzzy con-
trol, etc.), however, they are not good representations of vague notions. While 
these logics take gradualness into consideration, they do not incorporate the 
semantic indeterminacy aspect of vagueness.
A similar approach can also be found in works of some adaptive logics 
proponents (cf. van Kerkhove and Vanackere 2003; van der Waart, van Gulik 
and Verdée 2008).
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[I]t is up to a specific person, with specific purposes, in a specific situation, to 
make specific decisions about the upper and lower bound of the vague stroke of 
some specific predicate applied to some specific individual. (van Kerkhove and 
Vanackere 2003: 23)
As it is apparent, adaptive fuzzy logics also work with different interpretations 
of vague language. There is, however, a significant difference between them 
and fuzzy plurivaluationism. While adaptive fuzzy logics are only concerned 
with one fuzzy model at a time (like other application-oriented fuzzy logics), 
fuzzy plurivaluationism is considered not with particular fuzzy models, but 
with a fuzzy logic in a consequence relation sense. Not unlike supervaluation-
ism, fuzzy plurivaluationism also prefers supertruth to truth in a particular 
model. However, for a proponent of fuzzy plurivaluationism, supertrue prop-
ositions are those that come out true in all acceptable interpretations.
Naïve fuzzy approaches were the only approaches that successfully dealt 
with the jolt objection, however, they could not deal with the location objec-
tion. By implementing fuzzy logic into the framework of plurivaluationism, 
we can successfully deal with both jolt and location objection, thereby elimi-
nating higher-order vagueness problems altogether.
4.3. Three-valued plurivaluationism
Another recently proposed version of plurivaluationism employs three-va-
lued logic. This approach was pioneered by Wang (2016), whose goal was to 
present a three-valued plurivaluationism immune to both the location and the 
jolt objection, though he also tries to address the penumbral connections.
Wang’s three-valued plurivaluationism employs Kleene’s strong K ?? logic 
as its base logic (cf. Kleene 1938):
p q p . κ q p , κ q p → κ q p ↔ κ q
T T T T T T
T I T I I I
T F T F F F
I T T I T I
I I I I I I
I F I F I I
F T T F T F
F I I F T I
F F F F T T
Table 1: Kleene’s K?? logic (strong three-valued logic)
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Unlike Bochvar’s (1981) internal logic B?? (Kleene’s weak three-valued 
logic), which was employed to deal with vagueness by Halldén (1949), K?? 
better captures ideas commonly associated with some logical connectives, 
e.g., if the antecedent of an implication is false, then the implication is true, 
no matter the consequent’s truth-value.
In Wang’s system, there are sentences which are true/false simpliciter, 
i.e., true/false in every acceptable interpretation. This is comparable to the 
notion of supertruth in supervaluationism, however, Wang’s plurivaluation-
ist approach has the advantage of being able to cope with missing witnesses 
and missing counterexamples problems.6 While the supervaluationist approach 
cannot use any of the admissible precisifications as a witness/counterexample, 
plurivaluationist has no such problems, since all acceptable interpretations 
are at her disposal.
Wang’s approach, however, does not just use Kleene’s K?? logic in the 
framework of plurivaluationism. Even though using three-valued logic in the 
framework of plurivaluationism is enough to deal with the location problem, 
the jolt problem remains an issue, since in all acceptable interpretations there 
are jumps on the borderlines of the intermediate truth-value. In order to 
avoid the jolt problem, Wang’s approach is supplemented by special truth-
likeness metrics and a more fine-grained distinction to different borderline 
cases.
Even though Wang doesn’t want to introduce a system based on degrees 
of truth, such as Smith’s fuzzy plurivaluationism, there is some gradualness 
introduced by a new classification of borderline cases. While normal three-
valued logic-based approaches only consider objects in extension, anti-ex-
tension, and penumbral objects of any vague term, Wang (2016: 350) also 
introduces unclear borderline cases which he further classifies into -unclear 
and -unclear borderline cases. Propositions that are -unclear borderline are 
definitely not true, but it is not clear how to classify them further. -unclear 
borderline propositions are definitely not false, but their further classification 
is also unclear.
Wang’s system is also supplemented with special metrics to measure the 
degree of closeness to the truth (or falsity) simpliciter (cf. Wang 2016: 356). 
Wang claims that the degree of closeness to the truth (or falsity) simpliciter 
6 Missing witness – there are existential statements which are supertrue, yet supervalu-
ationist is unable to specify any particular statement that would confirm it. Missing coun-
terexample – there are universal statements which are superfalse, yet supervaluationist cannot 
specify any particular statement that would be a counterexample to it. The inductive premise 
of the mathematical induction sorites, "n (Fan Æ Fan+1), is superfalse, since it is false in all 
precisifications. Classically, for general claim to be false it takes at least one counterexample. 
In supervaluationism, however, we have no counterexample, since it is impossible to single out 
any of the precisifications (cf. Smith 2008: 84–85).
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is a way of introducing gradual change into the approach founded on three-
valued logic.
I find both these extensions of three-valued plurivaluationism very un-
appealing, for multiple reasons. First, let us consider notions of -unclear (and 
-unclear) cases. If a proposition is -unclear, then we know it is not false, 
however, we don’t know how to classify that proposition further. That means 
we are not sure if it is true, or if it has intermediate truth-value. Therefore, 
that proposition concerns a borderline borderline case. At this point, one has 
to ask why normal borderline cases are worthy of special treatment, getting 
their own truth-value, while -unclear are not. Moreover, is there any reason 
why one should limit herself to doing only one iteration, instead of continu-
ing and introducing -unclear, -unclear, and so on? Introducing -unclear and 
-unclear cases reintroduces higher-order vagueness back into the three-valued 
plurivaluationism and leads to an infinite regress. Moreover, one can wonder 
whether Wang’s system is three-valued at all since -unclear and -unclear cases 
seem much like an introduction of additional truth-values.
Metrics to measure closeness to truth/falsity simpliciter do very little as 
far as gradualness is concerned. While one may use some metrics to order 
objects in the range of a vague term’s significance and to order propositions 
mentioning these objects – this, after all, is what the Sorites Paradox is based 
on –, there is yet no absolutely gradual transition from truth to falsity sim-
pliciter (and vice versa), since there are still only three truth-values to choose 
from. If one wants a transition from truth to falsity to be gradual, one needs 
to employ degrees of truth.
Although combining three-valued logic with plurivaluationism is a 
promising enterprise, Wang’s version is a system with debatable usefulness. If 
one is motivated by an effort to create a system which does not suffer from 
the jolt objection, versions of plurivaluationism based on fuzzy logic are a 
natural choice.
The question is whether the jolt objection is an objection one should 
take seriously. While it is indisputable the location problem is a genuine 
problem concerning higher-order vagueness, the situation is less clear with 
the jolt problem. It is true there are vague terms which are a matter of degree, 
such as “red” or “tall”. There are also vague terms which may not be taken as a 
matter of degree. These are combinatory vague terms like “religion” or “sport”. 
While some versions of the Sorites Paradox are based on terms such as these, 
it must be said these versions seem quite artificial. While one surely can com-
pare football to curling, it is questionable if one can actually say that one of 
these is a sport to a greater degree than the other. While there may be some 
quantifiable aspects of sports which may be relevant to the applicability of the 
term “sport”, it is far from clear if such aspects can be used to order sports. In 
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these cases, at least, it seems that using a fuzzy logic-based approach would 
be a bit of a stretch, and either bivalent or three-valued approaches seem to 
be a more natural choice.
5. Conclusion
While the older approaches must deal with serious difficulties when dealing 
with the Sorites Paradox and vagueness, different versions of plurivaluation-
ism seem to fare much better. All versions of plurivaluationism can effectively 
defuse the location problem. Even though Smith makes a strong case for his 
fuzzy plurivaluationism, I believe it is not the only viable variant of plurivalu-
ationism, quite the contrary – different versions of plurivaluationism have 
their place. For many philosophers, classical plurivaluationism will be the 
obvious choice for its simplicity due to it making use of classical logic. For a 
more detailed analysis and more technical approaches, many-valued versions 
of plurivaluationism and fuzzy plurivaluationism seem to be better choices. 
Whatever version of plurivaluationism is employed, it defuses the Sorites 
Paradox without being exposed to the problem of location.
If one considers the jolt problem to be a genuine problem that a theory 
needs to address, one is left with only one choice – fuzzy plurivaluationism. 
While Wang attempted to formulate a version of three-valued plurivaluation-
ism that would account for the gradual change in truth, the enterprise doesn’t 
seem to have succeeded. If, on the other hand, one doesn’t consider the jolt 
to be a problem, then both classical and three-valued plurivaluationism seem 
to be good choices.7
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